Abstract. This article demonstrates the invalidity of Theorem VI in Gödel's 1931, showing that propositions (15) and (16), derived from the definition 8.1, in its proof, are false in PA.
Goldbach or Fermat) that, while contentually true, are unprovable in the formal system of classical mathematics." ( [6] 202-203) Nowadays developments regarding Fermat's last theorem [15] [14] , clarify that problems with no solution are not so unprovable in mathematics. We are then allowed to state that, in Gödel's convictions, around the existence of undecidable problems in mathematics, there was a presupposition of unprovability that the present article contribute to clarify.
Completeness is connected to decidability, since a resolution procedure utilizes that type of logical inferences which are also formalized in the axiomatic systems. Moreover, from the point of view of a finitely axiomatized formal system, completeness leads to a theoretical list of all the theorems, the "British Museum procedure" according to Türing, which is also a procedure of semi-decidability for first order logic.
To this regard, Lemmas, leading to the demonstration of the invalidity of Gödel's incompleteness, result to be clarifying and they open new perspectives, partially already exposed in [2] . Actually, present work applies the results obtained in [2] for the modern version of the incompleteness argumentation, which is based on the diagonalization lemma, directly to the text of Gödel's 1931 article, providing therefore as novel contribution, clear and advanced proof of invalidity on the original Gödel's argumentation. For all this aspects the result exposed here stands out from previous criticism about Gödel's 1931, mainly focussed on the antinomic features of Gödel's self-reference statement (see [10, 1, 12] resumed in [11] ; [13] ).
1.
Let us begin adding to the list of functions (relations) 1-45 in Gödel's 1931 two new relations, 45.1 and 46.1, in terms of the preceding ones by the procedures given in Theorems I-IV ( [5] 158-163). We shall recall only the well-known definitions 44., 45. and 46., for the whole list the reader is referred to ([5] 162-171).
is a PROOF ARRAY ( a finite sequence of FORMULAS, each of which is either an AXIOM or an IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE of two of the preceding FORMULAS).
xBy
x is a REFUTATION of the FORMULA y.
46. Bew(x) ≡ (Ey)yBx, x is a PROVABLE FORMULA. (Bew(x) is the first one of the notions 1-46 of which we cannot assert that it is recursive.) 46.1. Wid(x) ≡ (Ez)zW x, x is a REFUTABLE FORMULA. (Wid(x) is the second one of the notions 1-46 of which we cannot assert that it is recursive 1 Wid is the shortening for "Widerlegung" and must not be mistaken with the notion defined by Gödel in note 63 referring instead to "Widerspruchsfrei" ( [5] 192-193) , which afterwards we will call Wids.
Being classes included among relations, as one-place relation, 44. define the recursive class of the proof arrays. Recursive relations R have the property that for every given n-tuple of numbers it can be decided whether R(x 1 . . . x n ) holds or not. 45. and 45.1 define recursive relations, xBy and xW y, so that for every given couple of numbers it can be decided whether xBy and xW y hold or not. Accordingly we can state the following Lemmas.
Proof. Immediately by 46.1., 46., 45.1., 45. and Neg(Neg(x)) ∼ x.
Lemma 2. For any x, y in P not both xW y and xBy.
Proof. Let us suppose to have, for an arbitrary couple x, y, both xW y and xBy in P . By 45. and 45.1
For l(x) > 0 and n = l(x) this should be
which is impossible by 42. Ax(x), 43. F l(x, y, z) and by the definitions of the axioms and of immediate consequence in P .
Lemma 3.
For any x such that Bw(x) and any FORMULA y in P , xBy or xW y.
Proof. Let us suppose to have, for an arbitrary x, such that Bw(x), and an arbitrary FORMULA y, in P , xBy & xW y. Then by definitions 45. and 45.1 we have
Bw(x) is supposed to be true so that, by the recursiveness of l and Gl, [l(x)] Gl x = r will be true for some FORMULA r in P . Moreover, on account of the recursiveness of Neg, we will have for some FORMULA q in P either r = Neg(q) or r = Neg(q).
We obtain then the two cases:
for r = Neg(q), [l(x)] Gl x = Neg(q) so that
and, if we substitute q for y,
and, substituting r for y,
As one can easily see, both cases lead to false propositions, where the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Accordingly, for any x such that Bw(x), and any FORMULA y in P xBy & xW y, i.e. xBy ∨ xW y.
Lemma 4.
For any x such that Bw(x), and any FORMULA y, in P , xW y ∼ xBy.
Proof. Immediately by Lemma (2) and Lemma (3).
Let us notice that Lemma (4) yields, for any x such that Bw(x) in P , also (y)xW y ∼ (y)xBy and (y)xW y ∼ (y)xBy.
Lemma 5. For any y such that Bw(y), and any FORMULA x, in P ,
Proof. By 46.1. W id(x) ∼ (Ey)yW x, hence W id(x) ∼ (Ey)yW x and W id(x) ∼ (y)yW x. In accordance with Lemma (4) we obtain for any y such that Bw(y) and any FORMULA x W id(x) ∼ yBx. Similarly, by 46. Bew(x) ∼ (Ey)yBx, Bew(x) ∼ (Ey)yBx hence Bew(x) ∼ (y)yBx. Then Lemma (4) yields for any y such that Bw(y) and any FORMULA x Bew(x) ∼ yW x.
Let us recall the following Gödel's definitions ( [5] 173). Let κ be any class of FORMULAS and F lg(κ) the smallest set of FORMULAS that contains all FOR-MULAS of κ and all AXIOMS, and is closed under the relation IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE.
Let us augment this list with two new definitions.
Lemma 6. For any x such that Bw κ (x) and any FORMULA y in κ Bew κ (y) iff xB κ y and W id κ (y) iff xB κ y.
Proof. By Lemma (5) and previous definitions.
2.
We are now ready to derive the main result of this article, Theorem (8). xB κ (17 Gen r).
] . Lemma (6) yields for any x such that Bw(x), Bew κ (17 Gen r) iff xB κ (17 Gen r), accordingly from (I.1) (I.5)
Bew κ (17 Gen r),
and by Lemma (7) (I.6) Bew κ [Sb(r 17 Z(x) )]. (I.4) and (I.6) yield, for any x such that Bw(x),
Let us assume Q(x, y) in κ, so that, substituting p for y, (11), (12) and (13), we obtain (II.1) xB κ (17 Gen r).
From Lemma (6), for any x such that Bw(x), W id κ (17 Gen r) iff xB κ (17 Gen r), and II.1
Lemma (7) (1), we obtain , for any x such that Bw(x),
By (I) and (II), (15) and (16) turn out to be false for any x such that x is a P ROOF ARRAY in κ, and the demonstration of Theorem VI cannot be accomplished. Indeed, for n such that Bw(n), 
] has no basis to be obtained from nB κ (17 Gen r) in κ, and the demonstration that 17 Gen r is not κ-PROVABLE can not be accomplished. In accordance, (n) nB κ (17 Gen r) has no soundness as a consequence of (6.1) within next case "2. N eg(17 Gen r) is not κ-PROVABLE" ( [5] 176-177). Moreover, for n such that Bw(n), Bew κ [(Sb(r 17 Z(n) )] is not a consequence of nB κ (17 Gen r) in κ, so that the demonstration that N eg(17 Gen r) is not κ-PROVABLE can not be accomplished, as well.
Consequently the statement of Theorem VI, "For every ω-consistent recursive class κ of F ORM U LAS there are recursive CLASS SIGN S r such that neither v Gen r nor N eg(v Gen r) belongs to F lg(κ) (where v is the F REE V ARIABLE of r)" ( [5] 172-173), has not proof. Furthermore, the assertion that " it suffices for the existence of propositions undecidable that the class κ be ω-consistent ", is now meaningless ( [5] 176-177).
We can then state the following theorem.
Theorem 8. The existence of undecidable propositions of the form v Gen r is not a theorem in κ.
The invalidity of theorems VIII, IX and XI, all consequent of theorem VI, follows immediately ( [5] 184-194).
In the outlined derivation of theorem XI ( [5] 192-194) , the assertion that 17 Gen r is not κ-PROVABLE, together with the assumption about the consistency of κ, have now no justification. Therefore the statements 
